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Abstract
This paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political ne-
gotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over
which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties’ popularity varies over time.
Changes in popularity are partly exogenous and partly driven by the parties’ actions.
There is an election scheduled at a future date and the party with more popularity
at the election date wins the vote. Electoral incentives can have substantial effects
on bargaining outcomes. Periods of gridlock may arise when the election is close and
parties have similar levels of popularity.
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1 Introduction
An important element of political negotiations –especially negotiations over high-profile or
landmark legislation– is that agreements can have consequences that go well beyond imple-
mented policies. As Binder and Lee (2013) put it: “Negotiation in Congress is never solely
about policy; politics and policy are always intertwined.” Beyond policy considerations, po-
litical parties usually weigh whether compromising on a given issue is in their best electoral
interest. Reaching an agreement can lead to changes in the parties’ level of support among
voters, and these changes can be of crucial importance in determining electoral outcomes.
The goal of the current paper is to study how such electoral incentives affect the outcomes
of political negotiations. The results shed light on the circumstances under which electoral
considerations can lead to periods of gridlock and political inaction.
I study a complete information bargaining game between two political parties that have
to jointly decide which policy to implement. I consider a situation of divided government, in
which neither party has enough institutional power to implement policies unilaterally. As a
result, implementing a policy requires both parties to negotiate and reach an agreement.
A central element of the model is to recognize that, while bargaining, the parties’ electoral
support is likely to experience changes over time. Changes in the parties’ popularity may oc-
cur due to exogenous reasons, like short-run fluctuations in the voters’ moods or preferences.
In addition, the parties’ electoral support will typically also be affected by the actions that
parties take; in particular, by the agreements that they reach and the policies that they im-
plement. The model allows for both exogenous and endogenous changes in electoral support.
The parties’ popularity evolves over time as an exogenous stochastic process. When parties
come to an agreement, the policy that they agree to implement affects their popularity.
There is an election scheduled for some future date and the party that has more popularity
at the election date wins the vote. The party that wins the election obtains a non-transferable
private benefit. As a result, any agreement that parties reach has two effects on their payoffs:
a direct effect, since parties have preferences over policies, and an indirect effect, since the
policy that parties agree to implement affects their popularity and their electoral chances.
The model is flexible, allowing implemented policies to affect the popularity of the parties in
general ways. This flexibility allows me to study the dynamics of bargaining under different
assumptions regarding how policies affect electoral support.
The proximity of an election can have substantial effects on bargaining outcomes. I show
that the model’s unique equilibrium may involve periods of gridlock. These delays occur
in spite of the fact that implementing a policy immediately is always the efficient outcome.
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These periods of political inaction can only arise when the time left until the election is short
enough. Intuitively, parties cannot uncouple the direct effect of a policy from its indirect
effect on the election’s outcome. When the election is close, this may reduce the scope of
trade to the point that there is no policy that both parties are willing to accept.
The equilibrium dynamics depend on how implemented policies affect the parties’ electoral
support. I derive general conditions for gridlock and inefficiencies to arise. I show that
electoral considerations can only lead to gridlock when the policies that are good for a party
are politically costly; i.e., when good policies are bad politics. In contrast, parties are always
able to compromise whenever implementing their preferred alternative weakly improves their
electoral chances.
I use this general model to analyze the dynamics of bargaining under different assumptions
regarding how policies affect popularity. The first setting I consider is one in which the
majority party in Congress sacrifices popularity when it implements a policy that is close
to her ideal point. This trade-off between ideal policies and popularity arises when voters
punish the majority party if Congress implements extreme policies; i.e., policies that are far
away from the median voter’s ideal point. I show that gridlock will arise in this setting if the
benefit parties derive from winning the election is large. Moreover, gridlock is more likely
when the majority party in Congress has a small electoral advantage.
I also study a setting in which the party that obtains a better deal out of the negotiation
is able to increase her popularity. This link between agreements and popularity arises when
parties bargain over how to distribute discretionary spending and can use the resources they
get from the negotiation to broaden their level of support among the electorate. Parties
are always able to reach an agreement in this environment, but electoral incentives influence
the policies that parties implement. In particular, electoral incentives lead to more egali-
tarian agreements relative to a setting in which implemented policies don’t have electoral
consequences.1
The results in this paper highlight the importance of electoral considerations in under-
standing the dynamics of political bargaining and provide new insights as to when gridlock
is likely to arise. First, the model predicts that legislative productivity will tend to be higher
immediately after an election, and will decrease as the next election approaches. This is con-
sistent with the honeymoon effect, the empirical finding that presidents in the United States
enjoy higher levels of legislative success during their first months in office; e.g., Dominguez
1I also analyze a setting in which it is always politically costly for the minority party in Congress to
concede to the proposals made by her opponent. I show that there will also be gridlock in this setting if
parties attach a sufficiently high value to winning the election.
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(2005). This result is also consistent with Mayhew (1991), who finds that the US Congress
approves significantly fewer important laws in the two years prior to presidential elections
compared to the two years after. Second, the model also predicts that elections will have a
larger negative impact on legislative productivity in years in which the election’s outcome
is expected to be close. Third, my results show that the type of issue over which parties
are bargaining might be an important determinant of whether the proximity of an election
will lead to gridlock or not. Finally, the results in the paper suggest that elections might
have different effects on bargaining dynamics under different voting rules; in particular, the
results in the paper suggest that parties might find it easier to reach compromises under a
proportional system than under a “first-past-the-post” system.
A technical difficulty with analyzing the current model is that it has two payoff-relevant
state variables: the parties’ level of relative popularity and the time left until the elec-
tion. With two state variables it is difficult to obtain a tractable characterization of the
equilibrium. I sidestep this difficulty by providing upper and lower bounds to the parties’
equilibrium payoffs. These bounds on payoffs become tight as the election gets closer, are
easy to compute, and do not depend on the specific way in which policies affect the parties’
popularity. Moreover, these bounds on payoffs can be used to derive conditions for gridlock
to arise, and to study how the likelihood of gridlock depends on the time until the election
and on the parties’ level of popularity.
Starting with Baron and Ferejohn (1989), there is a large body of literature that uses non-
cooperative game theory to analyze political bargaining. Banks and Duggan (2000, 2006)
generalize the model in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) by allowing legislators to bargain over a
multidimensional policy space. A series of papers build on these workhorse models to study
the effect of different institutional arrangements on legislative outcomes.2 The current paper
adds to this literature by introducing a model to study how electoral incentives affect the
outcomes of political negotiations.3
This paper relates to Besley and Coate (1998) and Bai and Lagunoff (2011), who also
2Winter (1996) and McCarty (2000) analyze models a` la Baron-Ferejohn with the presence of veto play-
ers. Baron (1998) and Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) study legislatures with vote of confidence procedures.
Diermeier and Myerson (1999), Ansolabehere et al. (2003) and Kalandrakis (2004a) study legislative bargain-
ing under bicameralism. Snyder et al. (2005) analyze the effects of weighted voting within the Baron-Ferejohn
framework. Cardona and Ponsati (2011) analyze the effects of supermajority rules in the model of Banks
and Duggan. Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) construct a legislative bargaining model to study the differences
between parliamentarism and presidentialism in terms of their legislative success rate.
3There is also a growing literature that studies dynamic political bargaining models with an endogenous
status-quo. Papers in this literature include Kalandrakis (2004b), Diermeier and Fong (2011), Duggan and
Kalandrakis (2012), Dziuda and Loeper (2015), Nunnari (2012) and Bowen et al. (2013).
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study models in which current policies affect future political power and electoral outcomes.4
Besley and Coate (1998) and Bai and Lagunoff (2011) consider models in which the party
in power chooses policies unilaterally. In contrast, the current paper considers a setting in
which parties have to bargain to implement policies. This allows me to study how the link
between current policies and electoral outcomes affects bargaining dynamics.
This paper also relates to Simsek and Yildiz (2014), who study a bilateral bargaining game
in which the players’ bargaining power evolves stochastically over time. Simsek and Yildiz
(2014) study settings in which players have optimistic beliefs about their future bargaining
power. They show that optimism can give rise to costly delays if players expect bargaining
power to become more durable in the future. As a special application of this general insight,
Simsek and Yildiz (2014) consider political negotiations in the proximity of elections. Since
changes in the parties’ bargaining power are likely to become durable after an election,
optimism about future electoral outcomes can lead to periods of political inaction.
More broadly, this paper relates to the literature on delays and inefficiencies in bargain-
ing.5 In particular, this paper relates to the literature on conflict and bargaining failures as
a result of commitment problems; e.g., Fearon (1996, 2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000,
2001), Powell (2004, 2006) and Schwarz and Sonin (2008). In these models, the players’ inabil-
ity to commit to future offers puts a limit on how much they can transfer. Inefficiencies arise
when the transfers that the proposer can commit to are below what the responder is willing
to accept. The inefficiencies in the current paper are also driven by a limited transferability of
utility between parties. Indeed, since the benefit of winning the election is non-transferable,
the only way in which parties can transfer utility among them is by choosing which policy to
implement. When policies have electoral consequences, the transfers that parties can achieve
might not be enough to compensate for the electoral costs of compromising, making delay
inevitable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework, es-
tablishes existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and derives some general properties of the
model. Section 3 studies how the proximity of an election affects bargaining dynamics. Sec-
tion 4 discusses implications of the model and presents several extensions. All proofs are
collected in the Appendix.
4Other papers featuring a link between current policies and electoral outcomes are Milesi-Ferretti and
Spolaore (1994), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Hassler et al. (2003).
5For bargaining models featuring delays, see Kennan and Wilson (1993), Merlo and Wilson (1995), Abreu
and Gul (2000), Yildiz (2004), Compte and Jehiel (2004), Ali (2006), Acharya and Ortner (2013), Ortner
(2013) or Fanning (2014).
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2 Model
2.1 Framework
Parties, policies and preferences. Let [0, 1] be the set of alternatives or policies. Two
political parties, i = L,R, bargain over which policy in [0, 1] to implement. The set of
times is a continuum T = [0,∞), but parties can only make offers at points on the grid
T (∆) = {0,∆, 2∆, ...}. The constant ∆ > 0 measures the real time between bargaining
rounds. The bargaining protocol, to be described in more detail below, is a random proposer
protocol: at each time t ∈ T (∆) one party is randomly selected to make an offer.
Both parties are expected utility maximizers and have a common discount factor e−r∆
across periods, where r > 0 is the discount rate. Let zi ∈ [0, 1] denote party i’s ideal policy.
Party i’s utility from implementing policy z ∈ [0, 1] is ui (z) = 1− |z − zi|. Throughout the
paper I maintain the assumption that the parties’ ideal points are at the extremes of the
policy space, with zR = 1 and zL = 0.
6 This implies that uR (z) = z and uL (z) = 1 − z for
all z ∈ [0, 1], so this model is equivalent to a setting in which parties bargain over how to
divide a unit surplus.
Unlike models of legislative bargaining a` la Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Banks and
Duggan (2000, 2006), I assume that bargaining takes place between parties, not individual
legislators. This assumption reflects situations in which party leaders bargain over an issue
on behalf of their respective parties. The need for parties to negotiate arises when neither
party has enough institutional power to implement policies unilaterally. For instance, in
the United States parties have to negotiate to implement policies when the two chambers
of Congress are controlled by different parties, or when neither party has a filibuster-proof
majority in the Senate. The need for parties to negotiate also arises if the president (who
has veto power) is from a different party than the majority party in Congress. In sum, the
model in this paper is best suited to study instances of divided government.
Parties’ popularity. A key variable of the model is the publicly observable stochastic
process xt, which measures the parties’ relative popularity. Let w = {wt,Ft : 0 ≤ t <∞} be
a one-dimensional Brownian motion on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). From t = 0 until the
time at which parties reach an agreement, xt evolves as a Brownian motion with constant
6The assumption that the parties’ ideal policies are at the extremes of the policy space is without loss
of generality. If the policy space was [a, b] with a < zR and b > zL, all the alternatives in [a, zL) ∪ (zR, b]
would be strictly Pareto dominated by policies in [zL, zR]. It is possible to show that adding these Pareto
dominated policies would not change the equilibrium outcome.
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drift µ and constant volatility σ > 0, with reflecting boundaries at 0 and 1. That is, from
time t = 0 until the agreement date
dxt = µdt+ σdwt, (1)
if xt ∈ (0, 1). If xt reaches either 0 or 1, it reflects back.7 I use the convention that high
levels of x denote situations in which party L has a high level of popularity vis-a`-vis party
R, while low levels of x denote situations in which party R has a high level of popularity.
The policy that parties implement affects their popularity. If at time t ∈ T (∆) parties
reach an agreement to implement policy z ∈ [0, 1], popularity jumps at this date by ξ(xt, z);
that is, xt+ = lims↓t xs = xt + ξ(xt, z). Then, from time t+ onwards the process xt continues
to evolve as a Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ and with reflecting boundaries
at 0 and 1. The function ξ(·, ·) captures in a reduced-form way the effect that policies
have on popularity. I impose only two conditions on ξ(·, ·): (i) x + ξ(x, z) ∈ [0, 1] for all
x, z ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], and (ii) ξ(x, ·) is continuous for all x ∈ [0, 1]. The first condition
guarantees that the parties’ relative popularity always remains bounded in [0, 1] after parties
reach an agreement, while the second condition guarantees that there always exists an optimal
offer for the party with proposal power.
The model allows for general ways in which policies can affect popularity: not only do
different policies have a different effect on the level of popularity (i.e., for a fixed x, ξ(x, z) may
vary with z), but also the same policy may have a different effect on popularity depending
on the current level of x (i.e., for a fixed z, ξ(x, z) may vary with x). This general model can
accommodate a variety of settings. For instance, this model can accommodate environments
in which the party that obtains a better deal out of the negotiation is able to increase
her popularity; this is achieved by setting ξ(x, z) to be decreasing in z. The model can
also accommodate settings in which the majority party in Congress loses popularity when
Congress implements a policy that lies far away from the median voter’s preferred alternative;
for example, if party L is the majority party in Congress and the median voter’s preferred
policy is 1/2, then this is achieved by setting ξ(x, z) to be decreasing in |z − 1/2|.
Election. There is an election scheduled at a future date t∗ > 0, with t∗ ∈ T (∆). The
outcome of this election depends on the parties’ popularity at the election date. I assume
a “first-past-the-post” electoral rule under which the party with more popularity at date t∗
wins the election: party L wins if xt∗ ≥ 1/2 and party R wins if xt∗ < 1/2. The party that
7See Harrison (1985) for a for a detailed description of diffusion processes with reflecting boundaries.
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wins the election earns a payoff B > 0, which measures the benefit that parties derive from
being in office.8
A crucial assumption of the model is that the benefit B cannot be contracted upon
prior to the election.9 There are two justifications for this assumption. First, some of the
benefits from being in office are non-transferable (for instance, power or influence). Second,
while there are other benefits from winning elections that are transferable (like resources or
prestigious positions in committees), it might be impossible for parties to commit before the
election to execute agreements on how to divide them.
Bargaining protocol. The bargaining protocol is random proposer, with the party making
offers selected independently across periods. More formally, at any time t ∈ T (∆), t < t∗,
party L has proposal power with probability pL ∈ (0, 1) and party R has proposal power with
probability pR = 1− pL. The bargaining protocol after the election depends on the election’s
outcome: at any time t ≥ t∗ party L has proposal power with probability pˆL(xt∗) ∈ (0, 1)
and party R has proposal power with probability pˆR(xt∗) = 1− pˆL(xt∗), where pˆL(·) is weakly
increasing. Note that the bargaining protocol at times t ≥ t∗ is allowed to depend on the
outcome of the election. This assumption captures the idea that elections can lead to changes
in the parties’ bargaining position.
At each round t ∈ T (∆) the party with proposal power can either make an offer z ∈ [0, 1]
to her opponent or pass. If the responder rejects the offer or if the party with proposal
power passes, play moves to period t + ∆. Party i obtains a payoff ui(z) if the responder
accepts her opponent’s proposal to implement policy z ∈ [0, 1]. The game ends immediately
after the election if parties reach an agreement before time t∗. Otherwise, if parties have
not reached an agreement by time t∗, they continue bargaining according to the bargaining
protocol pˆi(xt∗) until they reach an agreement.
Solution concept. Let Γ∆ denote the bargaining game with time period ∆. I look for
the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of Γ∆. To guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs
I focus on SPE in which the responder always accepts offers that leave her indifferent be-
tween accepting and rejecting, and in which the party with proposal power always makes an
acceptable offer to her opponent whenever she is indifferent between making the acceptable
8For simplicity, I focus on the case in which there is a single election at time t∗. Section 4.2 discusses
how the results generalize to settings with multiple elections over time.
9If parties could contract before t∗ on how to divide the benefits from the election, then the model
would reduce to a bilateral bargaining game in which the surplus to be divided is the current policy plus the
discounted value of B.
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offer that maximizes her payoff or passing. The first condition rules out multiplicities arising
in knife-edge cases in which all acceptable offers by the responder leave this party indifferent
between accepting or rejecting, while the second condition rules out multiplicities arising in
knife-edge cases in which the proposer is indifferent between making the acceptable offer that
is best for her or passing. From now on I use the word equilibrium to refer to an SPE that
satisfies these properties.10
Discussion of modeling assumptions. There are two assumptions that merit further dis-
cussion. First, I model the parties’ popularity as evolving over time as a reflecting Brownian
motion with drift. This type of stochastic process naturally captures the frequent fluctua-
tions that electoral support usually exhibits. Moreover, this type of stochastic process has
the property that changes in popularity have a large effect on the parties’ electoral chances
when the election is expected to be close, and a more muted effect when one party has a
significant electoral advantage. As it will become clear below, this property of the popularity
process xt has implications regarding when the proximity of an election leads to gridlock.
11
Second, I assume that the parties’ popularity and electoral chances are affected by the
policies that are implemented prior to the election. This assumption implies that (at least a
fraction of) voters cast their vote retrospectively. There is considerable evidence supporting
the assumption of retrospective voters. For instance, Canes-Wrone et al. (2002), Jones and
McDermott (2004) and Jones (2010) find evidence that voters in US hold their representatives
accountable for their past job performance in Congress; see also Healy and Malhotra (2013)
for a recent overview of the empirical literature on retrospective voting.
2.2 Equilibrium
Proposition 1 Γ∆ has unique equilibrium payoffs.
In any SPE of Γ∆, parties reach an agreement at any time t ∈ T (∆), t ≥ t∗ if they have
not reached an agreement by this date. The expected payoff that party i ∈ {L,R} gets from
an agreement at time t ≥ t∗ is pˆi(xt∗).
Proposition 1 is silent about whether parties will reach an agreement before the election
or whether there will be delay. The next result shows that, if there is delay at times t < t∗,
this delay will only occur when the time left until the election is short enough.
10The restriction to SPE that satisfy these conditions is only to guarantee uniqueness of payoffs. Indeed,
the results in Section 3 continue to hold if we consider the entire class of SPE.
11I stress, however, that many of the results in the paper don’t rely on this particular assumption – see
Section 4.2.
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Proposition 2 (uniform bound on delay) There exists s > 0 such that, for any ξ(·, ·),
parties always reach an agreement at times t ∈ T (∆) with t∗ − t > s. The cutoff s is strictly
increasing in B.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. The discounted benefit e−r(t
∗−t)B of
winning the election is small when the election is far away and/or when the benefit of winning
the election is small. This limits the effect that implementing a policy has on the parties’
payoffs from the election, making it easier for them to reach a compromise. The cutoff s > 0
in Proposition 2 is increasing in B, so gridlock may arise when the election is further away
if parties attach a higher value to being in office.
2.3 Bounds on payoffs
In this subsection, I derive bounds to the parties’s equilibrium payoffs. For any function
f : [0, 1] → R and any s > t ≥ 0, let ENA[f(xs)|xt = x] denote the expectation of f(xs)
conditional on xt = x assuming that parties don’t reach an agreement between times t and
s; i.e., assuming that between t and s relative popularity evolves as a Brownian motion with
drift µ and volatility σ and with reflecting boundaries at 0 and 1.
Let ML := [1/2, 1] and MR := [0, 1/2), so that party i = L,R wins the election if xt∗ ∈Mi.
For all (x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, t∗) and for i = L,R, define
Qi(x, t) := ENA[1{xt∗∈Mi}|xt = x].
Term Qi(x, t) is the probability with which at time t < t
∗ party i is expected to win the
election when xt = x if parties don’t reach an agreement between t and t
∗. If parties reach
an agreement to implement policy z at t < t∗, the probability that party i wins the election
is Qzi (xt, t) := Qi(xt + ξ(xt, z), t). Figure 1 plots QL(·, t) for different values of t < t∗. For
future reference, it is worth noting that Qi(·, t) is steep when parties have similar levels of
popularity, and it becomes flatter as x approaches 0 or 1.
For i = L,R and for any t < t∗, let
Ui(z, x, t) := ui(z) + e
−r(t∗−t)BQzi (x, t)
be party i’s expected payoff from implementing policy z ∈ [0, 1] at time t < t∗ when xt = x:
if parties implement policy z at time t < t∗, party i gets ui(z) and wins the election with
probability Qzi (x, t).
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Figure 1: Probability that party L wins the election QL(x, t). Parameters: µ = 0, σ = 0.1,
t∗ = 1.
For all t < t∗, for all x ∈ [0, 1] and for i = L,R, define
W i(x, t) := ENA
[
e−r(t
∗−t)pˆi(xt∗)|xt = x
]
+Be−r(t
∗−t)Qi(x, t) and
W i(x, t) := W i(x, t) + 1− e−r(t
∗−t).
Term W i(x, t) is the expected payoff that party i would obtain if parties delayed an agreement
until the election. Note that W i(x, t) +W j(x, t) = 1 +Be
−r(t∗−t) for all t < t∗ and x ∈ [0, 1].
For all t ∈ T (∆) and all x ∈ [0, 1], let Wi(x, t) denote party i’s equilibrium payoff at a
subgame starting at time t ∈ T (∆) when xt = x and parties have not reached an agreement
by time t (by Proposition 1, these payoffs are unique).
Lemma 1 (bounds on payoffs) For all t ∈ T (∆), t < t∗, for all x ∈ [0, 1] and for i = L,R,
Wi(x, t) ∈ [W i(x, t),W i(x, t)].
The bounds in Lemma 1 are tight as the election gets closer: W i(x, t) − W i(x, t) =
1 − e−r(t∗−t) → 0 as t → t∗. Moreover, these bounds don’t depend on the way in which
policies affect the parties’ popularity; i.e., they don’t depend on the function ξ(·, ·).
Proposition 3 Consider a subgame starting at time t ∈ T (∆), t < t∗ at which parties have
not yet reached an agreement.
(i) If maxz∈[0,1] Ui(z, x, t) < W i(x, t) for some i ∈ {L,R}, parties delay an agreement at
time t if xt = x.
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(ii) If minz∈[0,1] Ui(z, x, t) ≤ W i(x, t) and W i(x, t) ≤ maxz∈[0,1] Ui(z, x, t) for some i ∈
{L,R}, parties reach an agreement at time t if xt = x.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. The range of payoffs that party i can
obtain from implementing a policy at t < t∗ is [minz Ui(z, xt, t),maxz Ui(z, xt, t)]. This range
is too small for parties to reach an agreement when maxz Ui(z, xt, t) < W i(x, t) for i ∈ {L,R},
since party i would never be willing to implement a policy that gives itself a payoff lower than
W i(x, t). On the other hand, the range of payoffs is large when minz Ui(z, x, t) ≤ W i(x, t)
and maxz Ui(z, x, t) ≥ W i(x, t), so in this case parties are able to find a compromise policy
that they are both willing to accept.
The force that reduces the range of payoffs [minz Ui(z, xt, t),maxz Ui(z, xt, t)] is a limited
transferability of utility between parties. Since the benefit from winning the election is non-
transferable, the only way in which parties can achieve transfers between them is by choosing
which policy z ∈ [0, 1] to implement. When policies have electoral consequences, the transfers
that parties can achieve by choosing a policy might not be enough to compensate the electoral
costs of reaching an agreement. When this happens, gridlock must arise in equilibrium; this
is the content of Proposition 3(i).
Proposition 3 can be used to study the equilibrium dynamics of this model: for each
(x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× T (∆) with t < t∗, the results in Proposition 3 can be used to check whether
parties will reach an agreement or not when the state of the game is (x, t).
Remark 1 There is a gap between the conditions in the two parts of Proposition 3: there
might exist states (x, t) at which the parties’ payoffs satisfy neither the conditions in part
(i) of Proposition 3 nor those in part (ii). Proposition 3 is silent about whether parties will
reach an agreement at those states. For each t ∈ T (∆), t < t∗, let I(t) ⊂ [0, 1] be the set of
values of x such that the parties’ payoffs at (x, t) satisfy neither conditions in Proposition 3.
Since the bounds on payoffs become tight as the election gets closer, the (Lebesgue) measure
of I(t) converges to 0 as t→ t∗.
3 Bargaining and gridlock in the shadow of elections
This section studies how the proximity of an election affects the dynamics of bargaining.
Section 3.1 derives necessary and sufficient conditions for gridlock to arise. Section 3.2
studies bargaining dynamics under different assumptions on how policies affect popularity.
Before presenting the general results, I introduce additional notation. Recall that, for all
12
(x, t) with t < t∗ and for all z ∈ [0, 1],
Qi(x, t) = ENA[1{xt∗∈Mi}|xt = x],
Qzi (x, t) = Qi(x+ ξ(x, z), t).
Term Qi(x, t) is the probability with which at time t party i is expected to win the election
when xt = x if parties don’t reach an agreement until time t
∗. Term Qzi (x, t) is the probability
with which party i is expected to win if parties agree to implement policy z at time t.
For any z ∈ [0, 1], (x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, t∗) and i = L,R, define
κi(z, x, t) := Q
z
i (x, t)−Qi(x, t)
to be the change in the probability that party i wins the election if policy z is implemented,
and
Di(x, t) := ENA[e−r(t
∗−t)pˆi(xt∗)|xt = x]
to be the expected payoff net of the election’s outcome that party i gets if parties delay an
agreement until after the election.
Definition 1 There is gridlock if there are states (x, t) ∈ [0, 1] × T (∆) at which parties
don’t reach an agreement. There is no gridlock if parties reach an agreement at all states
(x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× T (∆).
3.1 Conditions for gridlock
This section studies conditions under which gridlock and inefficiencies will arise. The first
result presents general conditions under which there is no gridlock.
Proposition 4 If x ∈ [0, 1] is such that ξ(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(x, 1), parties reach an agreement at
state (x, t) with t < t∗. If ξ(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(x, 1) for all x ∈ [0, 1], there is no gridlock.
Proposition 4 shows that parties are always able to compromise whenever implementing
their preferred alternative weakly improves their electoral chances. Clearly, a special case
covered by Proposition 4 is one in which the agreements that parties reach don’t have electoral
consequences; i.e., ξ(x, z) = 0 for all x, z.
To see the why Proposition 4 holds, suppose ξ(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(x, 1) for some x ∈ [0, 1] and
consider a subgame beginning at time t∗ −∆ with xt∗−∆ = x at which parties have not yet
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reached an agreement. Suppose party j 6= i is selected to be proposer. Note that
Ui(zi, x, t
∗ −∆) = 1 + e−r∆BQz=zii (x, t∗ −∆)
≥ 1− e−r∆ +Di(x, t∗ −∆) + e−r∆BQi(x, t∗ −∆)
= W i(x, t
∗ −∆),
where the first equality uses ui(zi) = 1, and the inequality uses Di(x, t
∗ − ∆) ≤ e−r∆ and
ξ(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(x, 1) (so that Qz=zii (x, t∗ −∆) ≥ Qi(x, t∗ −∆) for i = L,R). Similarly,
Ui(zj, x, t
∗ −∆) = e−r∆BQz=zji (x, t∗ −∆)
≤ Di(x, t∗ −∆) + e−r∆BQi(x, t∗ −∆)
= W i(x, t
∗ −∆),
where the first equality uses ui(zj) = 0, and the inequality uses Di(x, t
∗ − ∆) ≥ 0 and
ξ(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(x, 1) (so that Qz=zji (x, t∗ − ∆) ≤ Qi(x, t∗ − ∆) for i = L,R). These
inequalities, together with Proposition 3(ii), imply that parties reach an agreement at time
t∗ −∆. The same argument can be applied to all times t < t∗, establishing Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 presents general conditions under which there is no gridlock. The next
proposition provides a counterpart to that result: if ξ(·, ·) does not satisfy the conditions in
Proposition 4, then there are parameters of the model under which there is gridlock.
Proposition 5 Assume that either ξ(x, 0) < 0 or ξ(x, 1) > 0 for some x ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
there exists parameters B > 0 and pˆ(·) under which there is gridlock.
Taken together, Propositions 4 and 5 show that gridlock can only arise when a party
expects to lose popularity by implementing her most preferred policy. In this sense, electoral
considerations can only lead to gridlock when the policies that are good for a party are
politically costly; i.e., when good policies are bad politics.
While Proposition 5 shows that gridlock is possible when ξ(x, 0) < 0 or ξ(x, 1) > 0, it is
silent about the conditions that B and pˆ(·) have to satisfy for delay to arise. The next result
derives sufficient conditions under which there is gridlock.
Recall that κi(z, x, t) = Q
z
i (x, t) − Qi(x, t) is the change in the probability that party i
wins the election if policy z is implemented, and that Di(x, t) = ENA[e−r(t
∗−t)pˆi(xt∗)|xt = x]
is the expected payoff net of the election’s outcome that party i gets if agreement is delayed
until after the election. Note that ξ(x, 0) < 0 iff κL(zL = 0, x, t) < 0 and ξ(x, 1) > 0 iff
κR(zR = 1, x, t) < 0. Finally, for i ∈ {L,R}, define Zi(x, t) := {z ∈ [0, 1] : κi(z, x, t) < 0} to
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be the set of policies that reduce party i’s popularity.
Proposition 6 Let (x, t) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, t∗) be such that κi(zi, x, t) < 0 for some i ∈ {L,R}.
Assume that
(i) Di(x, t) > ui(z) for all z with κi(zi, x, t) ≥ 0; and
(ii) for all z′ ∈ Zj(x, t) and all z ∈ Zi(x, t),
Di(x, t)− ui(z′)
e−r(t∗−t)κi(z′, x, t)
> B >
Di(x, t)− ui(z)
e−r(t∗−t)κi(z, x, t)
. (2)
Then, parties delay an agreement at state (x, t).
The conditions in Proposition 6 imply that maxz Ui(z, x, t) < W i(x, t), and so by Propo-
sition 3(i) parties delay an agreement at state (x, t). To see why, note that for all z ∈ [0, 1],
Ui(z, x, t)−W i(x, t) = ui(z)−Di(x, t) +Be−r(t
∗−t)κi(z, x, t).
Term ui(z) − Di(x, t) is the policy payoff difference for party i between implementing z
now and delaying an agreement until after the election. Term Be−r(t
∗−t)κi(z, x, t) measures
the electoral consequences for party i from implementing policy z. The first condition in
Proposition 6 implies that Ui(z, x, t) < W i(x, t) for all policies z with κi(z, x, t) = 0. To
understand the second condition, consider first policies z that reduce party i’s popularity
(i.e., such that κi(z, x, t) < 0, so that z ∈ Zi(x, t)). When the second inequality in (2) holds,
the political cost Be−r(t
∗−t)κi(z, x, t) that party i incurs by implementing policy z outweighs
the gain ui(z) − Di(x, t), and so W i(x, t) > Ui(z, x, t). Similarly, consider policies z′ that
improve party i’s popularity (i.e., such that κi(z
′, x, t) > 0, so that z′ ∈ Zj(x, t)). The first
inequality in (2) implies that party i’s electoral gain Be−r(t
∗−t)κi(z′, x, t) from implementing
policy z′ is too small relative to the loss ui(z′)−Di(x, t) < 0, and so W i(x, t) > Ui(z′, x, t).
The last result of this section derives sufficient conditions for there to be agreement in
settings in which Proposition 4 does not apply.
Proposition 7 Let (x, t) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, t∗) be such that κi(zi, x, t) < 0 for some i ∈ {L,R}.
Assume that
(i) Di(x, t) ≥ ui(z) for all z with κi(z, x, t) ≥ 0; and
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(ii) there exist z ∈ Zi(x, t) such that
B ≤ Di(x, t) + (1− e
−r(t∗−t))− ui(z)
e−r(t∗−t)κi(z, x, t)
,
or z′ ∈ Zj(x, t) such that
B ≥ Di(x, t) + (1− e
−r(t∗−t))− ui(z′)
e−r(t∗−t)κi(z′, x, t)
.
Then, parties reach an agreement at state (x, t).
Proposition 7 shows that the conditions for gridlock in Proposition 6 are almost tight,
especially when the election is close: if B is slightly smaller or larger than the bounds in
(2), then parties will reach an agreement. The conditions in part (ii) are the counterpart of
those in Proposition 6(ii), and guarantee that maxz Ui(z, x, t) ≥ W i(x, t) = W i(x, t) + 1 −
e−r(t
∗−t). Indeed, when the first condition in part (ii) holds for some z ∈ Zi(x, t), the gain
ui(z) − Di(x, t) > 0 from implementing policy z for party i is strictly larger (by a margin
of 1 − e−r(t∗−t)) than the political cost e−r(t∗−t)Bκi(z, x, t), and so Ui(z, x, t) ≥ W i(x, t).
Similarly, when the second condition in part (ii) holds for some z′ ∈ Zj(x, t), the political gain
e−r(t
∗−t)Bκi(z′, x, t) from implementing policy z′ is strictly larger (by a margin of 1−e−r(t∗−t))
than the cost ui(z)−Di(x, t) ≤ 0, and so Ui(z′, x, t) ≥ W i(x, t). The conditions in part (i),
on the other hand, guarantee that minz Ui(z, x, t) ≤ W i(x, t). Together with Proposition
3(ii), these conditions imply that parties reach an agreement at state (x, t).
Remark 2 The condition that Di(x, t) > ui(z) for all z with κi(z, x, t) ≥ 0 in Proposi-
tion 6 is necessary to have maxz∈[0,1] Ui(z, x, t) < W i(x, t). Indeed, if (x, t) is such that
Di(x, t) ≤ ui(zˆ) for some zˆ with κi(zˆ, x, t) ≥ 0, then Ui(zˆ, x, t)−W i(x, t) = ui(zˆ)−Di(x, t) +
Be−r(t
∗−t)κi(zˆ, x, t) ≥ 0. For such states, Proposition 3(i) cannot be used to establish that
parties will delay an agreement.
3.2 Examples
This section studies how the proximity of elections affects the dynamics of bargaining under
different assumptions on how policies affect popularity.
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3.2.1 Electoral trade-off
I start by considering a setting in which the majority party in Congress faces the following
trade-off: implementing a policy that is close to her ideal point lowers her level of popularity,
while implementing a moderate policy allows her to maintain her level of support. This trade-
off arises when voters punish the majority party if Congress implements extreme policies; i.e.,
policies that are far away from the median voter’s ideal point.
Suppose that party L is the majority party in Congress. To model the trade-off described
above, I assume that for all (x, z) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1],
ξ(x, z) = −min {λ |z −m(x)| , x} , (3)
where λ > 0 measures the effect that implemented policies have on the majority party’s
popularity and m(x) ∈ (0, 1) is the location of the median voter’s ideal point. Assume that
m(·) is continuous and decreasing in x, so that the median voter’s ideal point is closer to
zi when party i’s popularity is high. This functional form for ξ(x, z) captures the trade-off
mentioned above, since the majority party (in this case party L) sacrifices popularity when
she implements a policy that is close to her preferred alternative (and far from the median
voter’s ideal point). The next result follows from Proposition 6.
Corollary 1 Let ξ(·, ·) be given by equation (3) with λ > 0. Assume that (x, t) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, t∗)
is such that
(i) DL(x, t) > 1−m(x), and
(ii) for all z 6= m(x),
B >
DL(x, t)− (1− z)
e−r(t∗−t)κL(z, x, t)
.
Then, parties delay an agreement at state (x, t).
Figure 2 illustrates the typical patterns of gridlock when ξ(x, z) satisfies equation (3) and
the conditions in Corollary 1 hold. The squared areas in the figure are the values of (x, t) at
which parties will delay an agreement. The shaded areas in Figure 2 are values of (x, t) at
which parties will reach an agreement.
Figure 2 shows that parties will delay an agreement when the majority party has a small
advantage, and that they will reach a compromise either when the majority party has a very
strong position or when the minority party has more popularity. To see the intuition for this,
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Figure 2: Agreement and gridlock regions when ξ is given by (3). Parameters: µ = 0,
σ = 0.05, r = 0.05, t∗ = 1, B = 1.5, λ = 0.1, m(x) = 1/2∀x and pˆL(x) = 1/4 + x/2.
consider first states at which the majority party has a small political advantage. When B
is large, at such states the majority party has a lot to lose by implementing a policy close
to her preferred alternative, since this would have a large negative impact on her electoral
chances. Moreover, at such states the majority party doesn’t want to implement a policy
close to m(x) either: since she has a small political advantage, by delaying an agreement
until the election date this party would likely be able to implement a policy that lies closer to
her ideal point. This implies that at such states any policy z ∈ [0, 1] would give the majority
party a lower payoff than what she could get by delaying an agreement until the election.
Thus, there must be delay.
Consider next states at which the majority party has a high level of popularity. At such
states, the majority party is willing to implement policies that lie relatively close to her
ideal point, since she would very likely still win the election even after implementing such a
policy. Moreover, at these states the minority party is also willing to implement policies that
are relatively close to her opponent’s ideal point, since doing this would increase (at least
marginally) her chances of winning the election. Thus, at these states parties are able to find
a compromise policy that they are both willing to accept.
Finally, consider states at which the minority party is leading. At such states, both parties
are willing to implement policies that are only slightly favorable to the minority party. The
majority party is willing to implement such a policy since it is better than what she expects
to get by delaying an agreement until after the election. On the other hand, the minority
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party is also willing to implement such a policy since it increases her electoral chances.
Note that, in this setting, parties are able to compromise when either party has a large
political advantage. The following corollary formalizes this.
Corollary 2 Fix a time t < t∗, and suppose that ξ(·, ·) is given by equation (3). Then, there
exists λ > 0 and  > 0 such that, if λ < λ, parties reach an agreement at all states (x, t) with
x ∈ [0, ] ∪ [1− , 1].
3.2.2 Costly concessions
I now consider a setting in which the majority party always benefits when a policy is im-
plemented. This specification of the model is motivated by empirical evidence showing that
voters usually hold the majority party accountable for the job performance of Congress (e.g.,
Jones and McDermott (2004) and Jones (2010)). As journalist Ezra Klein wrote in an article
for The New Yorker : “...it is typically not in the minority party’s interest to compromise
with the majority party on big bills – elections are a zero-sum game, where the majority wins
if the public thinks it has been doing a good job.”12
I model this by assuming that the majority party’s level of popularity jumps up discretely
if parties reach an agreement to implement a policy. Suppose again that party L is the
majority party, and that, for all (x, z) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1],
ξ(x, z) = min{g, 1− x}, (4)
where g > 0 is a constant. Note that in this setting it is always costly for the minority
party to concede to a policy put forward by her opponent: conceding to a policy lowers her
popularity by g and decreases her electoral chances.13
Corollary 3 Let ξ(·, ·) is given by equation (4) with g > 0. Assume that (x, t) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, t∗)
is such that
B >
DR(x, t)− 1
e−r(t∗−t)κR(x, t, 1)
.
Then, parties delay an agreement at state (x, t).
Figure 3 illustrates the typical patterns of gridlock when ξ(x, z) satisfies equation (4)
and the conditions in Corollary 3 hold. Figure 3 shows that parties will delay an agreement
12“Unpopular Mandate. Why do politicians reverse their positions?,” The New Yorker, June 25, 2012.
13The results in this subsection remain qualitatively unchanged if I allow the magnitude of the jump g to
depend on the implemented policy.
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Figure 3: Agreement and gridlock regions when ξ is given by (4). Parameters: µ = 0,
σ = 0.1, r = 0.05, t∗ = 1, B = 1.5, g = 0.1 and pˆL(x) = 1/4 + x/2.
either when they have very similar levels of popularity or when the minority party has a
small advantage. Intuitively, implementing a policy has a larger negative impact on the
minority party’s electoral chances when popularity is either balanced or when this party only
has a small advantage. When parties derive a high value from winning the election, at these
states there is no policy z ∈ [0, 1] that compensates the minority party for her lower electoral
chances, and so gridlock arises. On the other hand, the cost that the minority party incurs
by accepting an offer is lower either when this party has a very large advantage in terms of
popularity, or when her opponent is leading. Therefore, at such states it is easier for parties
to reach a compromise.
As in Section 3.2.1, in this setting parties are also able to compromise when one of them
has a large political advantage. The following corollary formalizes this.
Corollary 4 Fix a time t < t∗, and suppose that ξ(·, ·) is given by equation (4). Then, there
exists g > 0 and ε > 0 such that, if g < g, parties reach an agreement at all states (x, t) with
x ∈ [0, ε] ∪ [1− ε, 1].
3.2.3 Success begets success
This subsection considers a setting in which the party that obtains a better deal out of the
negotiation is able to increase her level of political support. For instance, this link between
agreements and popularity arises when parties bargain over how to distribute discretionary
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spending and can use the resources they get out of the negotiation to broaden their level of
support among the electorate.
Suppose that ξ(x, ·) satisfies ξ(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(x, 1) for all x ∈ [0, 1]; that is, party i’s
popularity is weakly larger after the agreement if parties implement i’s preferred policy. A
situation in which a better deal translates into more popularity can be modeled by further
assuming that ξ(x, ·) is decreasing for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Note that, by Proposition 4, parties
always reach an immediate agreement in this setting.
The next results show how the proximity of an election shapes the agreements that
parties reach. Before stating the results, note that a special case of this model is one in
which the agreements don’t have electoral consequences; i.e., ξ(x, z) = 0 for all x, z. For all
(x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, t∗) and for i = L,R, let zˆi(x, t) ∈ [0, 1] denote the agreement that parties
would reach at state (x, t) when party i has proposal power and policies don’t have electoral
consequences.
Lemma 2 Suppose ξ˜(·, ·) is such that, for all x ∈ [0, 1], ξ˜(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ˜(x, 1). For all t < t∗
and all x ∈ [0, 1], let zi(x, t) ∈ [0, 1] denote the agreement that parties would reach at state
(x, t) when party i has proposal power and ξ = ξ˜. Then
zi(x, t)− zˆi(x, t) = e−r(t∗−t)B
[
QL(x+ ξ˜(x, zi(x, t)), t)−QL(x, t)
]
. (5)
The next result uses equation (5) to study how electoral incentives affect the policies that
parties implement in settings in which a better deal translates into more popularity.
Proposition 8 Suppose ξ˜(·, ·) is such that, for all x ∈ [0, 1]: (i) ξ˜(x, ·) is decreasing, with
ξ˜(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ˜(x, 1), and (ii) ξ˜(x, 1/2) = 0. For all t < t∗ and all x ∈ [0, 1], let zi(x, t) ∈ [0, 1]
denote the agreement that parties reach at state (x, t) when party i has proposal power and
ξ = ξ˜.
(i) If zˆi(x, t) > 1/2, then zi(x, t) ∈ (1/2, zˆi(x, t)].
(ii) If zˆi(x, t) < 1/2, then zi(x, t) ∈ [zˆi(x, t), 1/2).
Proposition 8 shows that electoral considerations lead to more moderate policies compared
to a setting in which parties don’t have electoral incentives. Intuitively, in this setting the
policy that parties implement must compensate the weaker party (i.e., the party that gets a
worse deal) for her lower electoral chances.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Implications of the model
This paper shows how electoral considerations can affect the dynamics of inter-party nego-
tiations, leading to long periods of political gridlock. The model predicts that there may
be gridlock at times prior to an election, but that parties will always reach an agreement
after the election. Importantly, this result does not depend on there being only one election;
see Section 4.2 below for a discussion of how this result generalizes to settings with multiple
elections. An implication of this result is that we should expect to see higher levels of legisla-
tive productivity in periods immediately after elections. This is consistent with the so-called
honeymoon effect: the empirical finding that, in the United States, presidents enjoy higher
levels of legislative success during their first months in office; see, for instance, Dominguez
(2005). This result is also consistent with the empirical findings in Mayhew (1991), who
shows that US Congress approves significantly fewer important laws in the two years prior
to presidential elections compared to the two years after.
The model in Section 3.2.1 shows that when voters punish the majority party for im-
plementing extreme policies, gridlock is more likely to arise when the majority party has a
slight advantage in terms of popularity. On the other hand, the model of Section 3.2.2 shows
that when it is electorally costly for the minority party to concede, gridlock is more likely to
arise either when the minority party has an advantage in terms of popularity or when both
of them have similar chances of winning the vote. Note that in both models, parties are able
to reach a compromise when one of them has a high level of popularity (Corollaries 2 and
4). Taken together, these models suggest that elections will have a larger negative impact on
legislative productivity in years in which the election’s outcome is expected to be close. This
is a novel prediction of the model, which would be interesting to investigate empirically.
The model in the paper assumes a “first-past-the-post” electoral rule. Under this system
small changes in popularity can have large effects on electoral outcomes when the election
is expected to be close. This is the main reason why, in the models of Sections 3.2.1 and
3.2.2, it is more difficult for parties to reach a compromise when they have similar levels of
popularity. It is worth highlighting that under different voting systems elections might have a
different effect on bargaining dynamics. For instance, in parliamentary systems small changes
in popularity can only have a limited effect on electoral outcomes; and hence, according to
this model, parties would find it easier to reach compromises.14 This might be another reason
14Admittedly, the model in the current paper with two political parties is not well-suited to analyze most
22
why parliamentary systems tend to have a higher rate of legislative success than presidential
systems – see Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) for evidence on the differences in legislative success
rates between parliamentary and presidential systems.
The results above show that, with an upcoming election, the type of issue over which
parties are bargaining might be an important determinant of whether there will be gridlock
or not. In particular, Section 3.2.3 shows that parties will be able to reach an agreement
quickly when bargaining over how to distribute discretionary spending. This is another
implication of the model which would be interesting to investigate empirically.
Finally, Proposition 2 shows that gridlock will only occur when the election is close
enough; that is, when the time left until the election is smaller than s. The cutoff s is strictly
increasing in the value B that parties attach to winning the election. This result can be used
to obtain an estimate on the value that parties derive from winning an election based on
observable patterns of gridlock: if Congress becomes gridlocked t days before an election, we
can use the results in Proposition 2 to obtain a lower bound on B.
4.2 Extensions
I conclude by briefly discussing a few extensions and alternative interpretations of the model.
Multiple elections. The model assumes that there is a single election at time t∗. This
assumption implies that any subgame starting at time t ≥ t∗ at which parties haven’t yet
reached an agreement is strategically equivalent to a game without elections. Therefore, by
standard arguments in bilateral bargaining games, parties will always reach an agreement
immediately after the election if they haven’t done so before.
The model can be extended to allow for multiple elections over time. Indeed, suppose
that there is a second election scheduled for time t∗∗ > t∗. Suppose further that the time
between elections is large, with t∗∗−t∗ > s (where s is the threshold in Proposition 2). It then
follows from Proposition 2 that parties will reach an agreement immediately after the first
election if they haven’t done so before. Therefore, a model with multiple elections that are
sufficiently far apart in time would deliver similar equilibrium dynamics than the model with
a single election. In this setting, gridlock would only arise when the next election is close,
and parties would always be able to reach an agreement as soon as they pass an election.15
parliamentary systems. This discussion is meant to be suggestive of what we should expect in an appropriate
extension of the model designed to study political negotiations in parliamentary systems.
15Moreover, it can be shown that if the elections are sufficiently far apart in time, the parties’ payoffs
after the first election will be close to their payoffs pˆi(·) at times t ≥ t∗ in the model with one single election.
23
Other stochastic processes. Another assumption I made throughout the paper is that
the parties’ relative popularity evolves over time as a Brownian motion with drift µ and
volatility σ > 0, and with reflecting boundaries at 0 and 1. Besides naturally capturing the
frequent fluctuations that electoral support exhibits, this assumption implies that parties
find it harder to reach an agreement when they have similar chances of winning the vote.16
However, many of the results in the paper don’t rely on this assumption. Indeed, suppose
xt is an arbitrary stochastic process defined on some state space Ω with the property that
xt(ω) ∈ [0, 1] for all t and all ω ∈ Ω. For instance, xt could be a mean reverting process, or a
finite-state Markov chain. The election’s outcome depends on the realization of xt∗ : party L
wins the election if xt∗ ≥ 1/2 and party R wins if xt∗ < 1/2. As in the main text, let Qi(x, t)
be the probability with which party i is expected to win the election if there is no agreement
until time t∗, and let Qzi (x, t) be the probability with which party i wins the election if policy
z is implemented. Assume that Qzi (x, t) is continuous in z.
Note first that, in this setting, parties will also reach an agreement at time t ≥ t∗ if they
haven’t already done so. Indeed, any subgame that starts at a time t ≥ t∗ at which parties
have not yet reached an agreement is equivalent to a bilateral bargaining model with random
proposer. Hence, by standard arguments, parties reach an agreement at any time t ≥ t∗ if
they haven’t done so already. Moreover, party i’s expected payoff from that agreement is
pˆi(xt∗).
The parties’ payoffs at times t < t∗ are again difficult to characterize. However, by the
same arguments used in the proof of Lemma 1, party i’s payoff is bounded below byW i(x, t) =
ENA[e−r(t
∗−t)pˆi(xt∗)|xt = x] + Be−r(t∗−t)Qi(x, t), and is bounded above by W i(x, t) = 1 −
e−r(t
∗−t) + W i(x, t). Using these bounds on payoffs, it can be shown that Propositions 3, 4
and 5 continue to hold in this setting. Therefore, in this more general setting it is still true
that gridlock only arises when a party expects to lose popularity by implementing her most
preferred policy.
Alternative interpretations. The model admits other interpretations beyond the polit-
ical bargaining one that I emphasized throughout the text. Indeed, at an abstract level,
this model can be thought of as representing a non-stationary bargaining situation in which
The proof of this result is available upon request. Therefore, in this case the parties’ equilibrium payoffs at
times t < t∗ would be bounded by W i(x, t)− η and W i(x, t) + η, where η is a positive constant that depends
on the time t∗∗ − t∗ between elections such that limt∗∗−t∗→∞ η = 0. Applying the arguments in Section 2.3,
these bounds on payoffs can be used to study the equilibrium dynamics prior to the first election.
16Another advantage of this stochastic process is that it allows for easy computations of the bounds on
payoffs W i(x, t) and W i(x, t).
24
the agreement that bargainers reach today affects their continuation values at a future stage.
There are several real-life settings that fit this description. For example, in legal disputes, the
agreement that the bargaining parties reach may set a precedent that affects the resolution
of future legal conflicts between them. Similarly, in labor negotiations, the wage settlement
reached today may set workers’ expectations and demands at future negotiations. The results
in the current paper may help shed light into how bargaining will unfold in these alternative
environments. As a general principle, Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that in such strategic
interactions, delays and inefficiencies may arise whenever agreements that yield high current
payoffs to a party have a negative effect on her continuation value.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Section 2.2
For any function f : [0, 1] → R and any s > t ≥ 0, let ENA[f(xs)|xt = x] denote the
expectation of f(xs) conditional on xt = x assuming that parties don’t reach an agreement
between times t and s; i.e., assuming that between t and s relative popularity evolves as a
Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ and with reflecting boundaries at 0 and 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Note first that any subgame starting at time t ≥ t∗ at which
parties have not yet reached an agreement is equivalent to a standard bilateral bargaining
game with a random proposer. By standard arguments, in such a game players reach an
immediate agreement and the expected payoff of party i ∈ {L,R} is equal to the probability
with which this party makes offers.
Next, I show that the game has unique equilibrium payoffs. Fix an equilibrium, and let
Wi(x, t) denote party i’s equilibrium payoffs at time t ∈ T (∆) with xt = x if parties have not
yet reached an agreement by this date. By the arguments above, Wi(x, t
∗) = pˆi(xt∗) + B ×
1{x∈Mi} and Wi(x, t) = pˆi(xt∗) for all t > t
∗, where ML = [1/2, 1] and MR = [0, 1/2).
For i = L,R and t ∈ T (∆), t < t∗, let Ui(z, x, t) = ui(z) + e−r(t∗−t)BQzi (x, t) be the payoff
that party i gets by implementing policy z ∈ [0, 1] at time t when xt = x. Note that Ui(·, x, t)
is continuous (since ui(·), ξ(x, ·) and Qi(·, t) are continuous). Suppose that parties have not
reached an agreement by time t∗ −∆. For i = L,R, party i’s payoff if there is no agreement
at time t∗ −∆ is e−r∆ENA[Wi(xt∗ , t∗)|xt∗−∆ = x]. For i = L,R, let
Ai(x, t
∗ −∆) := {z ∈ [0, 1] : Ui (z, x, t∗ −∆) ≥ e−r∆ENA[Wi(xt∗ , t∗)|xt∗−∆ = x]},
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be the set of policies that give party i a payoff weakly larger than the payoff from delaying an
agreement one round. Let A(x, t∗−∆) := AL(x, t∗−∆)∩AR(x, t∗−∆). If A(x, t∗−∆) = ∅,
there is no policy that both parties would agree to implement. In this case there must be
delay at time t∗ −∆, so party i’s payoff is Wi(x, t∗ −∆) = e−r∆ENA[Wi(xt∗ , t∗)|xt∗−∆ = x].
Consider next the case in which A(x, t∗ − ∆) 6= ∅. If party j is proposer, she offers
zj(x, t
∗ − ∆) ∈ arg maxz∈A(x,t∗−∆) Uj(z, x, t∗ − ∆), and her opponent accepts this offer.17
In this case, for i = L,R, party i’s payoff is Ui(zj(x, t
∗ − ∆), x, t∗ − ∆). Hence, when
A(x, t∗ −∆) 6= ∅, in any equilibrium it must be that
Wi(x, t
∗ −∆) = piUi(zi(x, t∗ −∆), x, t∗ −∆) + (1− pi)Ui(zj(x, t∗ −∆), x, t∗ −∆).
The paragraphs above show that there are unique equilibrium payoffs Wi(x, t
∗ − ∆)
at states (x, t∗ − ∆). Consider next time t∗ − 2∆. Party i’s payoff in case of delay is
e−r∆ENA[Wi(xt∗−∆, t∗ −∆)|xt∗−2∆ = x]. For i = L,R, let
Ai(x, t
∗ − 2∆) := {z ∈ [0, 1] : Ui(z, x, t∗ − 2∆) ≥ e−r∆ENA[Wi(xt∗−∆, t∗)|xt∗−2∆ = x]},
and let A(x, t∗−2∆) := AL(x, t∗−2∆)∩AR(x, t∗−2∆). If A(x, t∗−2∆) = ∅, there is no policy
that both parties would agree to implement. In this case there must be delay at t∗ − 2∆, so
party i’s payoff is Wi(x, t
∗− 2∆) = e−r∆ENA[Wi(xt∗−∆, t∗)|xt∗−2∆ = x]. If A(x, t∗− 2∆) 6= ∅,
when party j has proposal power she offers zj(x, t
∗−2∆) ∈ arg maxz∈A(x,t∗−2∆) Uj(z, x, t∗−2∆)
and her opponent accepts this offer. In this case, in any equilibrium party i’s expected payoff
at time t∗ − 2∆ is
Wi(x, t
∗ − 2∆) = piUi(zi(x, t∗ − 2∆), x, t∗ − 2∆)
+(1− pi)Ui(zj(x, t∗ − 2∆), x, t∗ − 2∆).
Repeating these arguments for all t ∈ T (∆) establishes that this game has unique equilibrium
payoffs.
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that WL(x, t) +WR(x, t) ≤ 1 +Be−r(t∗−t) for all t < t∗ and
all x ∈ [0, 1]; that is, the sum of the parties’ payoffs is bounded above by the total payoff
17There are two things to note. First, when A(x, t∗ − ∆) 6= ∅ the set of policies that maximize party
j’s payoff is non-empty since A(x, t∗ − ∆) is compact and Uj(·, x, t∗ − ∆) is continuous. Second, by our
restriction on SPE, when A(x, t∗ − ∆) 6= ∅ the party with proposal power will always make an offer in
arg maxz∈A(x,t∗−∆) Uj(z, x, t∗ −∆) even if she is indifferent between making this offer or delaying, and the
responder will always accept such an offer even if she is indifferent between accepting and rejecting.
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they would get if they implemented a policy today, which is equal to uL(z) + uR(z) = 1,
plus the sum of the parties’ discounted payoff coming from the fact that one party will
win the election, which is equal to Be−r(t
∗−t). Therefore, there exists s > 0 such that
e−r∆ENA[WL(xt+∆, t + ∆) + WR(xt+∆, t + ∆)|xt = x] ≤ e−r∆(1 + Be−r(t∗−t)) < 1 for all t
with t∗ − t > s and all x ∈ [0, 1]; i.e., s solves 1 + Be−rs = er∆. Note that s is strictly
increasing in B. Note further that, for all t such that t∗ − t > s and for all x ∈ [0, 1], there
exists a policy z(x, t) ∈ [0, 1] such that ui(z(x, t)) ≥ e−r∆ENA[Wi(xt+∆, t + ∆)|xt = x] for
i = L,R. Since Ui(z(x, t), x, t) ≥ ui(z(x, t)), it follows that z(x, t) ∈ Ai(x, t) for i = L,R
(recall that Ai(x, t) = {z ∈ [0, 1] : Ui(z, x, t) ≥ ENA[e−r∆Wi(xt+∆, t+∆)|xt = x}). Therefore,
A(x, t) = AL(x, t) ∩ AR(x, t) 6= ∅, so parties reach an agreement at t.
A.2 Proofs of Section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 1. I first show that Wi(x, t) ≥ W i(x, t) for all t < t∗ and all x ∈ [0, 1].
To see this, note that party i can always unilaterally generate delay at each time t < t∗,
either by rejecting offers when her opponent has proposal power or by choosing to pass on
her right to make offers when making proposals. At times t < t∗, the payoff that party i
gets by unilaterally delaying an agreement until time t∗ is equal to ENA[e−r(t
∗−t)pˆi(xt∗)|xt =
x] + e−r(t
∗−t)BQi(x, t) = W i(x, t). Therefore, it must be that Wi(x, t) ≥ W i(x, t) for all (x, t)
with t < t∗.
Next, I show that Wi(x, t) ≤ W i(x, t) for all t < t∗ and all x ∈ [0, 1]. To see this, note
first that WL(x, t) + WR(x, t) ≤ 1 + Be−r(t∗−t) for all t < t∗ and all x ∈ [0, 1]: at any time
t < t∗, the sum of the parties’ payoffs cannot be larger than what they would jointly get by
implementing a policy at t. From this inequality it follows that for all t < t∗ and all x ∈ [0, 1]
Wi(x, t) ≤ 1 +Be−r(t∗−t) −Wj(x, t)
≤ 1 +Be−r(t∗−t) − ENA[e−r(t∗−t)pˆj(xt∗)|xt = x]− e−r(t∗−t)BQj(x, t)
= 1− e−r(t∗−t) + ENA[e−r(t∗−t)pˆi(xt∗)|xt = x] + e−r(t∗−t)BQi(x, t),
where the second inequality follows since Wj(x, t) ≥ W j(x, t) and the equality follows since
pˆL(x) + pˆR(x) = 1 for all x and since QL(x, t) +QR(x, t) = 1 for all x and all t < t
∗. Hence,
Wi(x, t) ≤ W i(x, t) for all t < t∗ and for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma A1 Fix a time t ∈ T (∆), t < t∗ and an x ∈ [0, 1]. If there exists a policy zˆ ∈ [0, 1]
and a party j ∈ {L,R} such that Uj(zˆ, x, t) = ENA[e−r∆Wj(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt = x], then parties
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reach an agreement at time t if xt = x.
Proof. Suppose such a policy zˆ exists, and note that zˆ ∈ Aj(x, t). Since WL(xt+∆, t+ ∆) +
WR(xt+∆, t+ ∆) ≤ 1 +Be−r(t∗−t−∆) for all xt+∆ ∈ [0, 1], it follows that,
ENA
[
e−r∆Wi(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt
] ≤ e−r∆ +Be−r(t∗−t) − ENA [e−r∆Wj(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt] . (A.1)
Since Ui(z, x, t) + Uj(z, x, t) = 1 + e
−r(t∗−t)B for all z ∈ [0, 1], party i’s payoff from imple-
menting policy zˆ at time t < t∗ with xt = x is
Ui(zˆ, x, t) = 1 +Be
−r(t∗−t) − Uj(zˆ, x, t)
= 1 +Be−r(t
∗−t) − ENA
[
e−r∆Wj(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt = x
]
.
This equation together with (A.1) implies that Ui(zˆ, x, t) > ENA[e−r∆Wi(xt+∆, t+∆)|xt = x],
so that zˆ ∈ Ai(x, t). Hence, A(x, t) = AL(x, t) ∩ AR(x, t) 6= ∅, so parties reach an agreement
at time t if xt = x.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let (x, t) be a state satisfying the conditions in part (i) of the
proposition, and suppose by contradiction that parties reach an agreement at time t when
xt = x. Since Ui(z, x, t) < W i(x, t) for all z ∈ [0, 1], this implies that party i’s equilibrium
payoff at state (x, t) is strictly lower than W i(x, t), a contradiction to the fact that W i(x, t)
is a lower bound to party i’s payoff at state (x, t). Thus, there must be delay at state (x, t).
Next, let (x, t) be a state satisfying the conditions in Proposition 3(ii). By Lemma 1,
ENA[e−r∆W i(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt] ≤ ENA[e−r∆Wi(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt]
≤ ENA[e−r∆W i(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt].
Note that, by the law of iterated expectations,
ENA[e−r∆W i(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt = x]
= ENA[e−r(t
∗−t)(pˆi(xt∗) +B1{xt∗∈Mi})|xt = x] = W i(x, t). (A.2)
Note further that,
ENA[e−r∆W i(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt = x] = e−r∆ − e−r(t∗−t) + ENA[e−r∆W i(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt]
= e−r∆ − e−r(t∗−t) +W i(xt, t) < W i(xt, t), (A.3)
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where the second equality follows from (A.2). Since Ui(·, x, t) is continuous and since minz Ui(z, x, t) ≤
W i(x, t) and maxz Ui(z, x, t) ≥ W i(x, t), there exists zˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that Ui(zˆ, x, t) =
ENA[e−r∆Wi(xt+∆, t+ ∆)|xt = x]. By Lemma A1, there is agreement at state (x, t).
A.3 Proofs of Section 3.1
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that zR = 1 and zL = 0 are, respectively, the ideal policies
of parties R and L. When ξ satisfies the assumptions in the statement of Proposition 4, for
all x ∈ [0, 1] and all t < t∗ and for i, j = L,R, i 6= j,
Ui(zj, x, t) = e
−r(t∗−t)BQi(x+ ξ(x, zj), t) ≤ e−r(t∗−t)BQi(x, t) ≤ W i(x, t), and
Ui(zi, x, t) = 1 + e
−r(t∗−t)BQi(x+ ξ(x, zi), t) ≥ 1 + e−r(t∗−t)BQi(x, t) ≥ W i(x, t).
Therefore, by Proposition 3(ii) parties reach an agreement at all states (x, t) with t ∈
T (∆), t < t∗.
Proof of Proposition 5. I consider the case in which ξ(x, 0) < 0; the case in which
ξ(x, 1) > 0 is symmetric and omitted. Since ξ(x, 0) < 0 and since ξ(x, ·) is continuous, there
exists  > 0 and z′ ∈ (0, 1) such that ξ(x, z) ≤ − for all z ∈ [0, z′].
Recall that DL(x, t) := ENA[e−r(t
∗−t)pˆL(xt∗)|xt = x]. Note that, for any d ∈ (0, 1), there
exists a bargaining protocol after the election pˆ(·) and a date t < t∗ such that DL(x, t) = d.
From now on, I fix a bargaining protocol pˆ(·) and a time t < t∗ such that DL(x, t) ≥ 1− z′.
I show that, for such a bargaining protocol, there exists a benefit from the election B > 0
such that UL(z, x, t) < WL(x, t) for all z ∈ [0, 1]. By Proposition 3, this implies that parties
delay an agreement at time t < t∗ if xt = x.
I first show that there exists Bˆ > 0 such that UL(z, x, t) < WL(x, t) for all z ∈ [0, z′]
whenever B > Bˆ. Let η1 := minz∈[0,z′] QL(x, t)−QzL(x, t) ≥ QL(x, t)−QL(x− , t) > 0, and
note that for z ∈ [0, z′],
UL(z, x, t)−WL(x, t) = 1− z −DL(x, t) + e−r(t
∗−t)B[QzL(x, t)−QL(x, t)]
≤ 1−DL(x, t)− e−r(t∗−t)Bη1.
Therefore, a sufficient to have UL(z, x, t) < WL(x, t) for all z ∈ [0, z′] is that
B > Bˆ :=
1−DL(x, t)
e−r(t∗−t)η1
. (A.4)
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Next, I define z′′ ∈ (z′, 1] as follows. If there exists z such that ξ(z, x) > 0, then z′′ :=
inf{z ∈ [0, 1] : ξ(z, x) > 0} (since ξ(·, x) is continuous, ξ(z′′, x) = 0). Otherwise, z′′ = 1. Note
that in either case, z′′ > z′. Since DL(x, t) ≥ 1− z′ and since ξ(z, x) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ (z′, z′′],
if follows that
UL(z, x, t)−WL(x, t) = 1− z −DL(x, t) + e−r(t
∗−t)B[QzL(x, t)−QL(x, t)] < 0
for all z ∈ (z′, z′′]. Therefore, if z′′ = 1, there is delay at state (x, t) whenever B > Bˆ.
Consider next the case in which z′′ < 1, so there exists z > z′′ such that ξ(z, x) > 0. Let
η2 := maxz∈[z′′,1]QzL(x, t)−QL(x, t) > 0, and note that for all z ∈ [z′′, 1],
U(z, x, t)−WL(x, t) = 1− z −DL(x, t) +Be−r(t
∗−t)[QzL(x, t)−QL(x, t)]
≤ 1− z′′ −DL(x, t) +Be−r(t∗−t)η2.
Therefore, U(z, x, t) < WL(x, t) for all z ∈ [z′′, 1] whenever
B < B˜ :=
DL(x, t)− (1− z′′)
e−r(t∗−t)η2
(A.5)
This, together with arguments above, implies that a sufficient condition for there to be delay
at state (x, t) is that B ∈ (Bˆ, B˜). Using equations (A.4) and (A.5),
B˜ > Bˆ ⇐⇒ DL(x, t) > d := η2 + (1− z
′′)η1
η2 + η1
∈ (0, 1).
Thus, for pˆ such that DL(x, t) > d and for B ∈ (Bˆ, B˜), there is delay at state (x, t).
Proof of Proposition 6. Let (x, t) be such that the conditions in the statement of the
proposition hold. I now show that, in this case, Ui(z, x, t) < W i(x, t) for all z ∈ [0, 1]. This,
together with Proposition 3(i), implies that parties delay an agreement at state (x, t). Note
that for all z ∈ [0, 1] and (x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, t∗),
Ui(z, x, t)−W i(x, t) = ui(z) + e−r(t
∗−t)Bκi(z, x, t)−Di(x, t).
Consider first policies z ∈ Zi(x, t) = {z ∈ [0, 1] : κi(z, x, t) < 0}. Note that, for such
policies,
Ui(z, x, t) < W i(x, t)⇐⇒ B >
Di(x, t)− ui(z)
e−r(t∗−t)κi(z, x, t)
.
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Consider next policies z with κi(z, x, t) = 0. For such policies, Ui(z, x, t) −WL(x, t) =
ui(z) − Di(x, t) < 0, where I used the assumption that Di(x, t) > ui(z) for all z with
κi(z, x, t) ≥ 0.
Finally, consider policies z ∈ Zj(x, t) = {z ∈ [0, 1] : κj(z, x, t) < 0} = {z ∈ [0, 1] :
κi(z, x, t) > 0}. For such policies,
Ui(z, x, t) < W i(x, t)⇐⇒ B <
Di(x, t)− ui(z)
e−r(t∗−t)κi(z, x, t)
.
The arguments above imply that, for (x, t) such that the conditions in the statement
of the proposition hold, Ui(z, x, t) < W i(x, t) for all z ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, by Proposition 3(i)
parties delay an agreement at state (x, t).
Proof of Proposition 7. Let (x, t) be such that the conditions in the statement of the
proposition hold. I now show that, in this case, minz Ui(z, x, t) ≤ W i(x, t) and maxz Ui(z, x, t) ≥
W i(x, t). This, together with Proposition 3(ii), implies that parties reach an agreement at
state (x, t).
I start by showing that minz Ui(z, x, t) ≤ W i(x, t). Suppose first that there exist z such
that κi(z, x, t) ≥ 0. Since κi(zi, x, t) < 0 and since κi(·, x, t) is continuous, there exists z′
such that κi(z
′, x, t) = 0. Note that, for such z′,
Ui(z
′, x, t)−W i(x, t) = ui(z′) + e−r(t
∗−t)Bκi(z′, x, t)−Di(x, t) ≤ 0,
where I used Di(x, t) ≥ ui(z) for all z such that κi(z, x, t) ≥ 0.
Suppose next that κi(z, x, t) < 0 for all z ∈ [0, 1]. Note then that
Ui(zj, x, t)−W i(x, t) = e−r(t
∗−t)Bκi(zj, x, t)−Di(x, t) < 0,
since ui(zj) = 0 and since κi(zj, x, t) < 0. Therefore, in either case, minz Ui(z, x, t) ≤
W i(x, t).
Next I show that maxz Ui(z, x, t) ≥ W i(x, t). Note that, for all z ∈ Zi(x, t),
Ui(z, x, t)−W i(x, t) = ui(z)− (1− e−r(t∗−t))−Di(x, t) +Be−r(t∗−t)κi(z, x, t) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ B ≤ Di(x, t) + (1− e
−r(t∗−t))− ui(z)
e−r(t∗−t)κi(z, x, t)
(A.6)
Hence, when (A.6) holds for some z ∈ Zi(x, t), maxz Ui(z, x, t) ≥ W i(x, t).
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Similarly, for all z ∈ Zj(x, t),
Ui(z, x, t)−W i(x, t) = ui(z)− (1− e−r(t∗−t))−Di(x, t) +Be−r(t∗−t)κi(z, x, t) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ B ≥ Di(x, t) + (1− e
−r(t∗−t))− ui(z)
e−r(t∗−t)κi(z, x, t)
(A.7)
Hence, when (A.7) holds for some z ∈ Zj(x, t), maxz Ui(z, x, t) ≥ W i(x, t).
The arguments above imply that minz Ui(z, x, t) ≤ W i(x, t) and maxz Ui(z, x, t) ≥ W i(x, t)
whenever (x, t) is such that the conditions in the statement of the proposition hold. Hence,
by Proposition 3(ii) parties reach an agreement at state (x, t).
A.4 Proofs of Section 3.2
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose ξ(·, ·) is given by (3), and note that κL(z, x, t) ≤ 0 for all
(x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, t∗) and all z ∈ [0, 1], with strict inequality for all z 6= m(x). By Proposition
6, parties delay an agreement at any state (x, t) such that: (i) DL(x, t) > 1−m(x), and (ii)
B > (DL(x, t)− (1− z))/e−r(t∗−t)κL(z, x, t) for all z 6= m(x).
Proof of Corollary 2. Before proving the corollary, I establish some properties of Qi(x, t).
For all s > 0 and all x, y ∈ [0, 1], let p(x, y, s) = Prob(xs = y|x0 = x) be the transition density
function of the process xt. It is well-known that p(x, y, s) solves Kolmogorov’s backward
equation (i.e., Bhattacharya and Waymire (2009), chapter V.6),
∂
∂s
p(x, y, s) = µ
∂
∂x
p(x, y, s) +
1
2
σ2
∂2
∂x2
p(x, y, s), (A.8)
with lims→0 p(x, y, s) = 1{y=x} and ∂p(x, y, s)/∂x|x=0 = ∂p(x, y, s)/∂x|x=1 = 0 for all s > 0.
Note that for all t < t∗ and for i = L,R, Qi(x, t) = ENA[1{xs∈Mi}|x0 = x] =
∫
Mi
p(x, y, t∗ −
t)dy. Since p(x, y, s) solves (A.8) with ∂p(x, y, s)/∂x|x=0 = ∂p(x, y, s)/∂x|x=1 = 0, it follows
that Qi(x, t) ∈ C2,1 for all (x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, t∗), with ∂Qi(x, t)/∂x|x=0 = ∂Qi(x, t)/∂x|x=1 =
0.
Suppose ξ(·, ·) is given by (3). Fix t < t∗ and let η > 0 be such that maxx∈[0,1] uL(zL) −
DL(x, t)−(1−e−r(t∗−t)) = maxx∈[0,1] e−r(t∗−t)−DL(x, t) ≥ ηBe−r(t∗−t).18 Since QL(x, t) ∈ C2,1
and since ∂Qi(x, t)/∂x|x=0 = ∂Qi(x, t)/∂x|x=1 = 0, there exists λ > 0 and  > 0 such that,
18Such an η > 0 exists since Di(x, t) < e
−r(t∗−t) for all x.
32
for all z, maxx∈[0,]∪[1−,1] κL(z, x, t) > −η whenever λ < λ. Therefore, for λ < λ,
uL(zL)−DL(x, t)− (1− e−r(t∗−t)) +Be−r(t∗−t)κL(zL, x, t) ≥ 0∀x ∈ [0, ] ∪ [1− , 1]
⇐⇒ UL(zL, x, t) ≥ WL(x, t)∀x ∈ [0, ] ∪ [1− , 1].
Moreover, for all x,
uL(zR)−DL(x, t) +Be−r(t∗−t)κL(zR, x, t) ≤ 0⇐⇒ UL(zR, x, t) ≤ WL(x, t),
where the first inequality uses uL(zR) = 0 and κL(zR, x, t) ≤ 0. Therefore, by Proposition
3(ii), parties reach an agreement at state (x, t) with x ∈ [0, ] ∪ [1− , 1].
Proof of Corollary 3. Suppose ξ(·, ·) is given by (4), and note that κR(z, x, t) < 0 for all
states (x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, t∗) and all z ∈ [0, 1]. Note further that, for all z ∈ [0, 1],
DR(x, t)− 1
e−r(t∗−t)κR(z = 1, x, t)
≥ DR(x, t)− uR(z)
e−r(t∗−t)κR(z, x, t)
.
Therefore, by Proposition 6, parties delay an agreement at state (x, t) when
B >
DR(x, t)− 1
e−r(t∗−t)κR(z = 1, x, t)
.
Proof of Corollary 4. Suppose ξ(·, ·) is given by (4), and fix t < t∗. Let η > 0 be such that
maxx∈[0,1] uR(zR) − DR(x, t) − (1 − e−r(t∗−t)) = maxx∈[0,1] e−r(t∗−t) − DR(x, t) ≥ ηBe−r(t∗−t).
Since QR(x, t) ∈ C2,1 and since ∂Qi(x, t)/∂x|x=0 = ∂Qi(x, t)/∂x|x=1 = 0 (see proof of Corol-
lary 2), there exists g > 0 and ε > 0 such that, for all z, maxx∈[0,ε]∪[1−ε,1] κR(z, x, t) > −η
whenever g < g. Therefore, when g < g,
uR(zR)−DR(x, t)− (1− e−r(t∗−t)) +Be−r(t∗−t)κR(zR, x, t) ≥ 0∀x ∈ [0, ε] ∪ [1− ε, 1]
⇐⇒ UR(zR, x, t) ≥ WR(x, t)∀x ∈ [0, ε] ∪ [1− ε, 1].
Moreover, for all x,
uR(zL)−DR(x, t) +Be−r(t∗−t)κR(zL, x, t) ≤ 0⇐⇒ UR(zL, x, t) ≤ WR(x, t),
where I used uR(zL) = 0 and κR(zL, x, t) ≤ 0. Therefore, by Proposition 3(ii), parties reach
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an agreement at state (x, t) with x ∈ [0, ε] ∪ [1− ε, 1].
The following Lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma A2 Let ξ˜(·, ·) and ξˆ(·, ·) be such that, for all x ∈ [0, 1], ξ˜(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ˜(x, 1) and
ξˆ(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξˆ(x, 1). For all x ∈ [0, 1] and all t < t∗, let W˜i(x, t) and Wˆi(x, t) be party i’s
payoff at state (x, t) when ξ = ξ˜ and ξ = ξˆ, respectively. Then, for all x ∈ [0, 1] and all
t < t∗, W˜i(x, t) = Wˆi(x, t).
Proof. Note that, by Proposition 4, there is no gridlock when ξ = ξ˜ or when ξ = ξˆ.
As a first step, I show that when ξ is such that ξ(x, 0) ≥ 0 ≥ ξ(x, 1) for all x ∈ [0, 1],
then for all (x, t) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, t∗) and for j = L,R, there exists an offer z ∈ [0, 1] such
that Uj(z, x, t) = ENA[e−r∆Wj(xt+∆, t + ∆)|xt = x] (i.e., such that party j is indifferent
between accepting and rejecting). To see this, note that by the proof of Proposition 4,
minz Uj(z, x, t) ≤ W j(x, t) and maxz Uj(z, x, t) ≥ W j(x, t). Note further that W j(x, t) =
ENA[e−r∆W j(xt+∆, t + ∆)|xt = x] and that W j(x, t) > ENA[e−r∆W j(xt+∆, t + ∆)|xt = x]
(see equations (A.2) and (A.3)). Then, by continuity of Uj(·, x, t) and by the fact that
Wj(x, t + ∆) ∈ [W j(x, t + ∆),W j(x, t + ∆)] for all x (Lemma 1), there must exist an offer
z ∈ [0, 1] such that Uj(z, x, t) = ENA[e−r∆Wj(xt+∆, t + ∆)|xt = x]. Note that this offer
maximizes party i’s payoff among the offers that party j 6= i finds acceptable at state (x, t)
when i has proposal power, and hence is the offer that party i makes in equilibrium.
I now use the observation in the previous paragraph to show that parties obtain the same
payoffs when ξ = ξ˜ than when ξ = ξˆ. The proof is by induction. Consider time t = t∗ −∆.
By the previous paragraph, if xt = x and party i has proposal power, she will make an offer
z such that Uj(z, x, t) = ENA[e−r∆pˆj(xt∗)|xt∗−∆ = x] + e−r∆BQj(x, t∗ −∆), and party j will
accept such an offer. Since pˆj(·) and Qj(·, ·) do not depend on ξ, player j gets the same payoff
at time t = t∗ −∆ if party i is proposer regardless of whether ξ = ξ˜ or ξ = ξˆ. Since parties
reach an agreement at t∗ − ∆, the sum of their payoffs is 1 + Be−r∆. Hence, if party i is
proposer she must also get the same payoff at time t∗−∆ regardless of whether ξ = ξ˜ or ξ = ξˆ.
Therefore, for all x ∈ [0, 1] and k = L,R, W˜k(x, t∗ −∆) = Wˆk(x, t∗ −∆) = Wk(x, t∗ −∆).
Suppose next that, for all x ∈ [0, 1] and k = L,R, W˜k(x, t) = Wˆk(x, t) = Wk(x, t) for all
t = t∗ −∆, t∗ − 2∆, ..., t∗ − n∆. Let s = t∗ − n∆. At state (x, s−∆), if party i has proposal
power she will make an offer z such that Uj(z, x, s−∆) = ENA[e−r∆Wj(xs, s)|xs−∆ = x], and
party j accepts such an offer. By the induction hypothesis, Wj(xs, s) is the same regardless
of whether ξ = ξ˜ or ξ = ξˆ. It follows that, regardless of whether ξ = ξ˜ or ξ = ξˆ, party j
gets the same payoff at time s −∆ if party i is proposer. Since parties reach an agreement
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at s−∆, the sum of their payoffs is 1 +Be−r(t∗−s+∆). Hence, if party i is proposer she must
also get the same payoff at time s −∆ regardless of whether ξ = ξ˜ or ξ = ξˆ. Therefore, for
all x ∈ [0, 1] and k = L,R, W˜k(x, s−∆) = Wˆk(x, s−∆) = Wk(x, s−∆).
Proof of Lemma 2. Let zˆi(x, t) be the offer that party i makes at time t if xt = x when
ξ(x, z) = 0 for all (x, z) (i.e., when policies don’t affect popularity). Note that the payoff
that party L gets from this offer is UL(zˆi(x, t), x, t) = 1 − zˆi(x, t) + e−r(t∗−t)BQL(x, t). On
the other hand, if ξ(x, z) = ξ˜(x, z), party i makes offer zi(x, t), and party L gets a payoff
equal to UL(zi(x, t), x, t) = 1 − zi(x, t) + e−r(t∗−t)BQL(x + ξ˜(x, zi(x, t)), t). Since by Lemma
A2 parties get the same payoff regardless of whether ξ(x, z) = 0 or ξ(x, z) = ξ˜(x, z), it must
be that UL(zˆi(x, t), x, t) = UL(zi(x, t), x, t), which implies equation (5).
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose that x and t are such that zˆi(x, t) > 1/2. Note that the
left-hand side of (5) would be strictly positive if zi(x, t) > zˆi(x, t), while the right-hand side
would be weakly negative (since QL(·, t) is strictly increasing and ξ˜(x, ·) is decreasing and
satisfies ξ˜(x, 1/2) = 0). On the other hand, if zi(x, t) ≤ 1/2 then the left-hand side of (5)
would be strictly negative and the right-hand side would be weakly positive. Hence, it must be
that zi(x, t) ∈ (1/2, zˆi(x, t)]. A symmetric argument establishes that zi(x, t) ∈ [zˆi(x, t), 1/2)
for all (x, t) such that zˆi(x, t) < 1/2.
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